We formulate an intraprocedural information flow analysis algorithm for sequential, heap manipulating programs. We prove correctness of the algorithm, and argue that it can be used to verify some naturally occurring examples in which information flow is conditional on some Hoare-like state predicates being satisfied. Because the correctness of information flow analysis is typically formulated in terms of noninterference of pairs of computations, the algorithm takes as input a program together with two-state assertions as postcondition, and generates two-state preconditions together with verification conditions. To process heap manipulations and while loops, the algorithm must additionally be supplied "object flow invariants" as well as "loop flow invariants" which are themselves two-state, and possibly conditional.
(NI) [19] provided that for any two runs of P , if P is executed from two input states that are L-indistinguishable (i.e., the input states agree on the values of L-variables) then it yields output states that are also L-indistinguishable. A sound information flow analysis guarantees that the programs it accepts are noninterferent.
This paper formulates a sound intraprocedural information flow analysis algorithm -rather than a type-based or logic-based specification -for heap manipulating programs. We assume that such programs are more or less decorated with assertion statements and loop/object invariants; such invariants can in many cases be automatically checked by tools such as BLAST [21] , ESC/Java [14] or Spec# [8] . A novel aspect of the algorithm is that it reasons about possibly conditional information flow, and also handles while loops and common data structures when armed with flow invariants (introduced in the sequel). We leave the automatic inference of flow invariants for future work.
Given a variable x labeled L, the formulation of noninterference entails that we restrict our attention to pairs of states σ1, σ2 where σ1(x ) = σ2(x ). This observation inspired Amtoft et al. [2, 1] to a logical rendition of NI which uses agreement assertions of the form x , where two states σ1, σ2 satisfy x when σ1(x ) = σ2(x ). If a program P has observable input variables x1, . . . , xn , and observable output variables y1, . . . , ym , then NI can be recast as {x1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn } P {y1 ∧ . . . ∧ ym }.
The meaning (partial correctness) of the above triple is that for any two states σ1, σ2 that agree on the values of x1, . . . , xn (as asserted by the precondition), if one run of P transforms σ1 to σ 1 and another run of P transforms σ2 to σ 2 , then the values of y1, . . . , ym agree in the final states, σ 1 , σ 2 (as asserted by the postcondition). 1 Amtoft et al. [1] specify, in logical form, a modular interprocedural information flow analysis for sequential, heapmanipulating programs. The specification is flow sensitive (unlike most type-based approaches), and uses "region assertions" to associate variables with "abstract locations", abstracting sets of concrete locations. Therefore it is possible to do a limited form of alias analysis, and we give examples where the absence of information leaks is demonstrated by showing that two variables must not alias; we also address applications to analyzing observational purity. Moreover, the specification can be used to check compliance with delimited release policies [24] in a technically straightforward manner: extend agreements over variables to agreements over "escape-hatch" expressions that syntactically specify such policies. More recently, the specification has been proposed as a crucial component for the verification of statedependent declassification policies [6] .
Amtoft et al. [1] present an analysis algorithm which, however, has some limitations: it essentially needs to know the "shape" of the heap, and must be provided method summaries. While working to mitigate those limitations, we discovered some shortcomings of the underlying logic, primarily due to the fact that it employs three kinds of primitive assertions (agreement, region, programmer) which can be combined only through conjunction. As a consequence, programmer assertions are not smoothly integrated, and it is not possible to capture conditional information flows. These shortcomings make it difficult to analyze information flow in non-trivial programs, especially ones that involve reasoning about common data structures. (A similar situation prevails with extant security type systems [26, 5, 22] .)
Contributions. This paper shows how to reason about information flow that may be conditional, and how to compute it for programs that may manipulate common data structures. The algorithm (Sect. 4) takes as input a program and a (possibly conditional) agreement assertion as postcondition, and as output generates preconditions and verification conditions (VCs). Currently, the algorithm expects the user to provide loop invariants and object invariants that are themselves (conditional) agreement assertions; we call such invariants flow invariants. The algorithm always terminates, but the VCs may be unsatisfiable; this will happen if the flow invariants are not strong enough. The correctness of the algorithm is proved directly wrt. the underlying semantics; this is unlike [2, 1] which first establish the semantic soundness of a logic and next provide a sound implementation of that logic. We use the algorithm to verify some naturally occurring examples. A prototype implementation 2 is currently being developed by Jonathan Hoag. An example loop flow invariant is x , with the following informal semantics: if two states, σ1 and σ2, agree on the value of x , and one iteration of the loop transforms σ1 into σ 1 and σ2 into σ 2 , then also σ 1 and σ 2 agree on the value of x . If the invariant is conditional, like i > n ⇒ x , then σ 1 and σ 2 are required to agree on x only if they both assert i > n, whereas σ1 and σ2 can be assumed to agree on x only if they both assert i > n. (We defer examples of object flow invariants to Sect. 2.) A second contribution of the paper is the underlying semantic framework (Sect. 3) for such conditional assertions that mixes ordinary, Hoare-logic style predicates with two-state agreement assertions.
A third contribution is the smooth integration with standard assertions, the presence of which can help the algorithm to increase precision. A simple example of this is the program if w then x := 7 else x := 7; assert(x = 7).
Given the postcondition x , the algorithm will compute (x = 7 ⇒ x ) as the precondition of the assertion statement; this is justified in all contexts because we employ a correctness criterion which considers only executions that terminate successfully, and the assertion will abort if x = 7 (which of course cannot happen in the given context). Since (x = 7) ⇒ x always holds, it can be simplified to true, which when given as postcondition to the conditional is also returned as the precondition. Without the ability to use and/or derive/infer the assertion statement, however, the precondition would need to include w . The inference of such "standard" assertions can be done by, e.g., BLAST, but will not be our concern in this paper.
EXAMPLES
We now illustrate, by way of examples in Figs. 1 and 2 , the issues involved in verifying information flow policies for while loops, as well as for programs that manipulate the heap using field update, field access and object allocation.
Loop flow invariants. Consider the program P in Fig. 1(a) , and the policy specification {x } {res }. Does P satisfy this specification? That is, will two runs of P for which the values of x agree in the initial states also yield final states in which the values of res agree? Note that the precondition does not make any commitments about v and h .
To answer the above question, observe that since the program updates res (line 4), for res to hold at the end, v must also hold. Alas, v holds only at the beginning of every odd iteration of the loop -but fortunately, this is exactly when v is used to update res. It turns out that to verify the program we need the loop flow invariant odd (i) ⇒ v which testifies to conditionally secure information flow within the loop.
3 Furthermore, after res is updated, the assignment to v (line 5) invalidates the invariant because h may not hold. But because i is incremented by 1 (line 8), odd (i) is falsified and the invariant is reestablished, vacuously, at the beginning of the next (even) iteration of the loop. Our algorithm, applied to the program in Fig. 1 (a) and equipped with a loop flow invariant containing odd (i) ⇒ v , generates valid verification conditions (VCs) together with a precondition that includes x but not h . Thus the program is deemed secure.
Note that standard security type systems do not take conditional loop flow invariants like the one above into account and therefore, given that res has type L and h has type H , reject the program as insecure: well-typedness demands v to have type L, due to the assignment to res (line 4), and also to have type H , due to the assignment to v (line 5). (The security type given to a while loop can be interpreted as an unconditional loop flow invariant, which in this case is not precise enough.)
Object flow invariants. The next example is motivated by an actual program, used in hardware verification of operational amplifiers, that was provided by our industrial collaborators, Rockwell-Collins. The example also serves to introduce the heap manipulating fragment of the language we analyze. We are given a collection of objects where each object has three fields: val containing its "value", src containing the "source" object whose value will be used to update the val field, and idx containing the object's index in the collection. The overall policy specification is that odd elements should be public; formally, we need to specify Intuitively, for this to hold we must demand that if the val field of an object with odd index is updated with a value q, then the source object whose val field contains q must be one with odd index. We therefore assert an implication based on the above intuition:
It is well-known that standard Hoare logic does not handle heaps very well, a key issue being "pointer swing" that leads to aliasing. An update of u.f may affect w .f if u and w may alias. Rather than employ a may-alias analysis, we demand that all field accesses and updates be scoped. Fig. 1(b) shows the program that corresponds to the one above. It also exemplifies the syntax of the language that we analyze: it is a simple imperative language, extended with assertions and scoped heap manipulating commands (field accesses, field updates, object allocation). A formal BNF appears in Sect. 3.
Because of scoped field accesses and updates, we no longer need a prefix for a field as this is clear from the scope. In general, to compare claims about two different scopes, as in assert(odd (x .idx ) → odd (y.idx )), we need to save the result of x .idx into a variable i. It turns out that we must assist our analysis by explicitly asserting (line 10) that when x is opened the second time, the index is still i.
The task of each scope is now to maintain the object flow invariant. To see that reasoning about aliasing is not a problem, observe that it is possible that updating the object pointed to by x also updates the object pointed to by y. However, this is permissible as long as the new object state satisfies the object flow invariant.
Note that the assertions used in the program (lines 6, 10) might be eliminated by theorem proving tools used in conjunction with other static analyses. In particular, the first assertion (line 6) could be eliminated in case we can prove, say, that for all objects o we have o.src.idx = o.idx + 2.
Our algorithm for verification condition generation, when given as input the program in Fig. 1 Combining loop flow invariants, object flow invariants, and allocation. Next, we consider the example in Fig. 2 , featuring a heterogeneous list pointed to by x and represented as a node chain, where one node can be reached from another by traversing next links. The val field of each node contains either a high (H ) value or a low (L) value, where the protocol is that a value is L provided it is less than 10. Informally, the list satisfies an object flow invariant .val < 10 ⇒ val .
We wish to split the list pointed to by x and output two homogeneous lists, pointed to by y and z ; here y will point to a list containing all the nodes of x with val fields that are L, i.e., less than 10, whereas z will point to a list containing the other nodes of x . Since the final value of res is taken from the list pointed to by y, the overall policy specification is {x } {res }. Our algorithm verifies that the program in Fig. 2 satisfies this specification: from postcondition res it generates precondition x and some valid VCs.
For the verification process, object flow invariants are needed; one might think that we need one invariant for each kind of node but those can be combined into a "universal" object flow invariant, using a field .t which tags the lists x , y and z with 1, 2, 3 respectively.
Here (.val < 10) is satisfied by a pair of states if they agree on the value of the comparison (but not necessarily on the value of .val ).
The example also shows scoped object allocation, where new objects (pointed to by y1 and z1) are allocated in the heap and their fields initialized as shown. Once all fields are initialized, the object flow invariant must have been established so that when the scope new . . . close is exited the object is in a "steady state".
Readers familiar with the Boogie methodology [7] might notice some similarity between open . . . close and Boogie's unpack and pack, where the object invariant must be reestablished at the end of every field update. Boogie requires object invariants to be associated with every object of a class. Our language seems impoverished in comparison to Boogie's in that we have the equivalent of a single universal class, but as the above object flow invariant shows, the use of tags enables us to encode multiple invariants.
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS

Expression syntax. An expression E ∈ Exp is either an
arithmetic expression A ∈ AExp or a boolean expression B ∈ BExp, given by the syntax
where we use x , y, . . . to range over variables in Var, and f , g, . . . to range over field names in Fld, and c to range over integer constants, and op to range over arithmetic operators in {+, ×, mod, . . .}, and bop to range over comparison operators in {=, <, . . .}.
We write fv(E ) (or ff(E )) for the variables (field names) occurring free in E . We write E [A/x ] for the result of substituting all occurrences of x in E by A; similarly we write E [A/.f ]. We say that E is field-free if E contains no field names, and that E is an object expression if E contains no variables.
We assume that each variable and each field is either for integers or for pointers (to objects), as prescribed by a function type mapping Var ∪ Fld into {int, obj}. We shall only consider programs that are "well-typed" in that respect. In particular, we disallow pointer arithmetic; the only operation allowed on pointers is pointer equality. Therefore, if type(x ) = obj then x ∈ fv(A) only if A is x , and x ∈ fv(B ) only if B is of the form either x = x or A = x or x = A with x / ∈ fv(A).
Semantic domains.
A value (v ∈ Val ) is an integer n, a location ∈ Loc, or nil; default values are defined as deflt (int) = 0 and deflt (obj) = nil, and we write deflt (f ) for deflt (type(f )). A store s ∈ Store maps variables to values, an object state r maps field names to values, and a heap h ∈ Heap maps locations to object states; the notions of dom( ) and ran( ) are as usual except that (with misuse of notation) we write
Expression semantics. The semantics of an arithmetic (boolean) expression is a function from stores and object states into values (booleans). If an expression E is field-free (an object expression), the "r " component (the "s" component) can be omitted. We have, e.g., [ 
One-state assertions. We use φ ∈ 1Assert to range over "standard" assertions, given by the syntax
We may define true as 0 = 0, and false as 0 = 1; as usual, we define φ1 → φ2 as ¬φ1 ∨ φ2. We write φ[A/x ] for the result of substituting all occurrences of x in φ by A; similarly we
The satisfaction relation for assertions reads s,r |= φ and denotes that φ holds in the one state comprised of the store s and the object state r . The definition is standard and elided. We say that φ is field-free if φ contains no field names, in which case the r component can be omitted; we say that φ is an object assertion if φ contains no variables, in which case the s component can be omitted.
Command syntax. A command S ∈ Cmd is either a toplevel command TS ∈ TCmd or a record command RS ∈
RCmd; the latter is executed within the scope of a single object and is thus allowed to reference its fields. The syntax is given in Fig. 3 , where in the grammar for TS we demand that all instances of A, B , and φ are field-free.
Command semantics. A record command transforms the store, and the state of the object being manipulated, into another store and another object state; hence its semantics is given in relational style, in the form s,r [ Two-state assertions. We use θ ∈ 2Assert to range over conditional agreement assertions, also called 2-assertions; they are of the form φ ⇒ E which intuitively is satisfied by a pair of states if either at least one of them does not satisfy φ, or they agree on the value of E . As we cannot expect two runs to choose the same fresh location for object allocation, we employ a bijection β between locations; we extend β so that c β c for all integers c, nil β nil, True β True, and False β False.
Then we define s,r &s1,r1 |= β θ, the satisfaction relation for 2-assertions, by s,r &s1,r1 |= β φ ⇒ E iff whenever s,r |= φ and
For θ = (φ ⇒ E ), we call φ the antecedent of θ and write φ = ant(θ), and we call E the consequent of θ and write 
E = con(θ).
We say that θ is field-free if it contains no field names, in which case the r and r1 can be omitted, and say that θ is an object 2-assertion if it contains no variables, in which case the s and s1 can be omitted. We often write E for true ⇒ E . We use Θ ∈ P(2Assert) to range over sets of 2-assertions, with conjunction implicit. Thus s,r &s1,r1 |= β Θ iff ∀θ ∈ Θ : s,r &s1,r1 |= β θ.
Object flow invariants. We assume that there exists a set of object 2-assertions, I, that serves as a flow invariant for every object (cf. the discussion at the end of Sect. 2). We shall demand that for two runs of the program, the heap part obeys this invariant (except when an object is being manipulated within a scoped construct), and thus define h&h1 |= β I iff for all , 1 with β 1: h( )&h1( 1) |= β I.
ALGORITHM
We shall define, in Figs. 5 and 6, an algorithm VCgen for inferring preconditions, and verification conditions, from postconditions. We write 4 [VC ]{Θ} (R) ⇐= S {Θ } if from input S and Θ , VCgen returns output Θ, R, and VC . Here S is a command, Θ is the desired postcondition for S , and Θ is a precondition for S that is designed so as to be sufficient to establish Θ ; if S is a top-level command then VCgen requires Θ to be field-free and ensures that Θ is fieldfree. We shall shortly explain the role of the verification conditions VC , but shall first explain the R component which captures how 2-assertions in Θ relate to 2-assertions in Θ . More precisely, we have R ⊆ Θ×{m, u}×Θ where tags m,u are mnemonics for "modified" and "unmodified"; we use γ to range over {m, u}. We write dom(R) = {θ | ∃(θ, , ) ∈ R} and ran(R) = {θ | ∃( , , θ ) ∈ R}. Intuitively, if (θ, , θ ) ∈ R then θ is in the precondition because θ is in the postcondition (θ is an origin of θ); moreover, if (θ, u, θ ) ∈ R then additionally it holds that S modifies no "relevant" variable or field name, where a "relevant" variable is one occurring in the consequent of θ . For example, if S is x := w then R might contain the triplets (q
Verification conditions (VCs)
We use VC to range over sets of verification conditions, and write |= VC iff |= vc holds for all vc ∈ VC . Now assume that some vc in the output of VCgen cannot be satisfied. (This is the only way that VCgen can "fail" on a well-typed program.) Looking at the clauses, we see that vc must have been generated by either open or while. The former case would reflect the failure to prove that I is indeed a flow invariant for objects in the heap; the user would then need to propose another object flow invariant. The latter case would reflect the failure to prove that the given postcondition is indeed a loop flow invariant; the user If TS contains no new commands, we may choose β = β, but otherwise β may be a proper extension of β so as to model that new heap locations have been allocated. Condition 4 is a bit nonintuitive, but it is (at least currently) needed for the proofs to carry through, and it is non-restrictive as it can be fulfilled by adding to Θ a trivial 2-assertion true ⇒ 0 . Theorem 4.2 is proved in a companion technical report [4] , by establishing a number of auxiliary properties. These properties have largely determined the design of VCgen and will thus guide us as we later explain the various clauses of Figs. 5 and 6.
The first such property is a variant of the "*-property" by Bell and La Padula [10] , also called "write confinement" [5] , which is used to preclude, e.g., "low writes under high guards". In our setting, it captures one role of the R component and reads as follows:
Lemma 4.3 (Write Confinement). Assume [VC ]{Θ} (R) ⇐= S {Θ } . Then dom(R) = Θ and ran(R) = Θ . Given θ ∈ Θ , there exists at most one θ such that (θ, u, θ ) ∈ R. If there exists such θ, then con(θ) = con(θ ), and with E = con(θ) we have • if s, [[S ]] s , then s agrees with s on fv(E );
• if s,r [[S ]] s ,r (thus S is of form RS ) then also r agrees with r on ff(E ).
Lemma 4.3 is needed in the proof of Theorem 4.2 (and Prop. 4.1) to handle the case where the two runs in question follow different branches in a conditional, as we must then ensure that neither run modifies a variable (field name) on which we want the two runs to agree afterwards. We now embark on explaining the various clauses of VCgen. For an assignment x := A, each 2-assertion φ ⇒ E in Θ produces exactly one 2-assertion in Θ, given by substituting A for x (as in standard Hoare logic) in φ as well as in E ; the connection is tagged m when x occurs in E . The treatment of field update is similar, and of skip even simpler. The rule for S1 ; S2 works backwards, first computing the precondition for S2 which is then used to compute the precondition for S1; the tags express that a consequent is modified iff it has been modified in either S1 or S2. The rule for assert allows us to weaken 2-assertions, by strengthening their antecedents; this is sound since execution will abort from states not satisfying the new antecedents.
To motivate the treatment of if B then S1 else S2, assume that φ ⇒ E occurs in Θ . First we partition Θ into two sets, Θ m and Θ u ; a 2-assertion can be in the latter set if its consequent is not modified by the conditional. If (φ ⇒ E ) ∈ Θ u , we can assume from Lemma 4.3 that the precondition of each Si will contain a 2-assertion of the form φi ⇒ E ; these can now be combined by R0 into one single precondition. On the other hand, if (φ ⇒ E ) ∈ Θ m then E has been modified by at least one branch; therefore, we should not allow two runs to take different branches if they both satisfy φ afterwards. This is ensured by R 0 , while R 1 (R 2 ) caters for the case where both runs choose S1 (S2). Fig 1(a) 
Example 4.4. Consider the result of applying VCgen to the body of the while loop in
while the then branch produces R1 containing
Referring to the clause for if in Fig. 5, we 
is always true (as two states satisfying ¬odd (i) will agree on the value of odd (i)). Assuming VCgen is able to carry out such basic simplifications, it will return, for the body of the while loop, an R component containing
(x , u, x ) (¬odd (i) ⇒ x , m, odd (i) ⇒ v )
The noteworthy part is that even though the postcondition mentions v , and v is updated using h, VCgen generates a precondition which does not mention h, since it exploits the parity of i .
For a while loop, VCgen checks whether the given postcondition Θ can indeed serve as a flow invariant. (As mentioned earlier this may fail in which case the user must strengthen the postcondition.) First we partition Θ into two sets, Θm and Θu ; a 2-assertion can be in the latter set if its consequent is not modified by the loop body. Now VC2 serves a similar function as R 0 did in the clause for conditionals: by demanding a precondition with the loop test B as consequent, it ensures that if one run stays in the loop and updates a variable on which the two runs must agree, then also the other run stays in the loop. When both runs stay in the loop, VC1 ensures that the loop flow invariant is maintained.
The need for VC3, VC4 and VC5 is less obvious, but they are designed so as to establish an auxiliary result, stated below as Lemma 4.5. VC3 demands that Θm contains an assertion θm with a "weakest" antecedent. (This is no 
• if S = TS : whenever s,h [[S ]] s ,h and s |= ant(θ ) then s |= ant(θ).
For S = while B do S0, if θ ∈ Θu we can use θ = θ , otherwise we can use θ = θm .
We now address the clause for open x in RS close, where we first compute in Θ0 a precondition for RS , given a postcondition that is augmented with I (as the object flow invariant must be re-established at the end). Note that we must remove from Θ0 any references to field names; for that purpose we assume that there is a function ff + : 1Assert → 1Assert such that if φ = ff + (φ) then (i) φ is field-free, and (ii) φ logically implies φ . These demands are trivially fulfilled if ff + (φ) = true for all φ, but a more precise solution is possible; then, e.g., ff
+ returns x = 7 given x = 7 ∧ ¬(.f = 8). Thus, e.g., Θ will (by R3 or R4) contain
Equipped with ff + , we can explain the various clauses, first R4 which "lifts out" assertions in Θ0 that originate from a top-level assertion and whose consequents have not been modified. Now consider an assertion in Θ0 whose consequent has been modified. If the resulting consequent is not field-free, we must demand that it follows from the object flow invariant, as expressed by VC2. Otherwise, it can be lifted out of the scope, as done by R3. (A precondition, say (.f + x ) might need to be replaced by the two assertions x and .f which together are strictly stronger; the former can be lifted out, the latter must follow from I.) Also, assertions in I whose consequents have not been modified (and therefore still contain field names) must follow from I, as expressed by VC1. The role of R1 and R2 is to ensure that if a relevant variable (in Θ or in I) is modified, the two runs are indeed manipulating the same object.
Note that R2 ensures that there are "m" tags going out from all 2-assertions in the postcondition of a command that modifies a consequent of a 2-assertion in I. This property is required by the following Lemma: 
To see why Lemma 4.6 is needed, recall that the correctness of if and while rests on Lemma 4.3 which ensures that if two runs follow different paths then they do not modify consequents of top-level assertions. Lemma 4.6 now further ensures that two such diverting runs do not invalidate object flow invariants.
The clause for new x in RS close first computes in Θ0 a precondition for RS , and then exploits that the semantics of new initializes all fields to a default value. So if Θ0 contains say .f = 1 ⇒ y , we generate the (vacuously true) precondition 0 = 1 ⇒ y ; if Θ0 contains say (.f + y) , we generate the precondition (0 + y) . We also want to eliminate x from the precondition; this is possible due to the freshness of the new location and the absence of pointer arithmetic: after object allocation, x = A can hold only if A is x . For the antecedents, this is formalized by the function rm x : 1Assert → 1Assert which is a homomorphism on the structure of φ, which maps (x = x ) to true, which maps (x = A) and (A = x ) to false if A is not x and hence x / ∈ fv(A), and which maps any B not containing x to itself. For the consequents, we also exploit that two runs will always agree on the value of x after allocation (as β can be extended to relate the fresh locations), implying that the two runs will agree on the value of any expression containing x . This is formalized by the function rm r x : Exp → Exp which maps E into 0 if x ∈ fv(E ), and into E otherwise.
Simplifying assertions. As can be seen by inspecting, e.g., the clause for conditionals, the preconditions generated by VCgen may contain a number of assertions which is exponential in the size of the program. Our implementation therefore needs to be able to simplify assertions, replacing a precondition with one which is equivalent. In particular, it is important (cf. Example 4.4) to recognize when a 2-assertion has an antecedent which is always false, or when it is of the form φ ⇒ B where φ implies B (or ¬B ), since then it can be eliminated. Preliminary experiments with our prototype implementation indicate that a few such rules are sufficient to yield readable preconditions; this makes us hope for a running time which is close to linear though further experiments are needed.
Let us be a bit more formal about what must hold, apart from {θ1, . . . , θn } 2 θ, when θ is replaced by θ1 . . . θn . Lemma 4.5 requires that for at least one i ∈ {1 . . . n} we can verify ant(θ)
1 ant(θi ). Moreover, we need to record in R that θ is related to each θi , and if we want to assign the tag u we must demand (due to Lemma 4.3) that n = 1 and con(θ) = con(θ1). These considerations suggest that rather than eliminating a 2-assertion which is always true, we replace it by a designated such assertion, e.g., true ⇒ 0 .
WORKED OUT EXAMPLE
In this section we work out the example in Fig. 1(b) ; the other examples are worked out in the technical report. We want to prove that the program satisfies the specification {x } {odd (i) ⇒ res }. The object flow invariant, I, is a conjunction of odd (.idx ) ⇒ .val and odd (.idx ) ⇒ .src .
We first consider the last open, lines 9-13 of Fig. 1(b) , where we must analyze the body (lines 10-12) with a postcondition which is odd (i) ⇒ res conjoined with the object flow invariant. Using VCgen's clauses for assignment, field update, and assert, this yields an empty set of VCs, and R0 containing
Applying the clause for open now generates the valid VC
whereas VC2 is empty (because the relevant assertions are of the form ⇒ q but q is field-free). Also, it generates a set R which is the union of the sets R1, R2, R3 below (since R4 is empty).
We have assumed that ff + maps odd (.idx ) ∧ (.idx = i), and odd (i) ∧ (.idx = i), into odd (i). Now the precondition of lines 9-13 can be read off from the above sets as {odd (i) ⇒ x , x , odd (i) ⇒ q } where the first assertion can be removed as it follows from the second, leaving us with {x , odd (i) ⇒ q }.
Lines 1-8 of Fig. 1 
and precondition {odd (i) ⇒ y , x }. Finally, the analysis of lines 1-4 of Fig. 1(b) For the overall program, VCgen generates a set of VCs which is the union of the VCs generated for each open; we note that they are all valid.
DISCUSSION
A recently popular approach to information flow analysis is self-composition, first proposed by Barthe et al. [9] and later extended by, e.g., Terauchi and Aiken [25] and Naumann [23] . Self-composition works as follows: for a given program S , a copy S is created with all variables renamed (primed); with the observable variables say x , y, then NI holds provided the sequential composition S ; S when given precondition x = x ∧ y = y also ensures postcondition x = x ∧ y = y .
Terauchi and Aiken [25] use self-composition to verify information flow automatically using the BLAST tool [21] . To obtain good experimental results, they introduce sound program transformations of self-composed programs; it is also often necessary to leverage the results of a standard information flow analysis, e.g., one based on security types. In a sense, our approach is dual in that noninterference properties are explicit in our analysis but we can leverage standard assertions, inserted and/or checked by general verifiers. An interesting question is whether the 2-assertions generated by VCgen could be translated into assertions that would assist the self-composition approach.
Terauchi and Aiken [25] do not address heap-manipulating programs, so the work most closely related to ours is the one by Naumann [23] whose goal is the verification of information flow using existing verifiers like Spec# [8] or ESC/Java2 [14] . Naumann's contribution is to extend the theory of self-composition to account for manipulations of heap objects. In some cases, like for while loops, it is more practical (but not necessary) for the technique to perform program transformations. For heap-manipulating programs, the two copies of the programs involve different sets of objects and therefore the correspondence between the objects ("mates" in Naumann's terminology) must be made explicit in the specification of the composed program. Our approach avoids program transformations, and our specifications do not need to specify mates: that is handled by the semantics of assertions. On the other hand, we cannot use an existing verifier like Spec# or ESC/Java2 directly; we must thus show how preconditions and VCs are actually generated.
Dufay et al. [17] use self-composition to check noninterference for data mining algorithms implemented in Java, using the Krakatoa tool, based on the Coq theorem prover and using JML [12] . The tool reads Java input files and produces specifications for Coq and a representation of the semantics of the Java program into the input language of Why 5 , an annotated, ML-like core language with references. We leave the comparison between Krakatoa's handling of the heap and that of ours to future work. Darvas et al. [16] use the KeY tool for interactive verification of noninterference. Information flow is modeled by a dynamic logic formula, rather than by assertions as in self-composition.
Bergeretti and Carré [11] present a compositional method for inferring dependence among variables; this technique forms the basis for the Spark Ada Examiner [13] which requires that each method is annotated with derives annotations like derives v from y,z & w from x,y
It is interesting to observe that such "channels" of information flow are captured by our R component, as when
[VC ]{x , y , z } (R) ⇐= S {v , w } with R containing the elements (y , , v ), (z , , v ), (x , , w ), (y , , w ). Our approach is more general in that it also captures conditional channels; we are part of current work investigating how to extend the Spark Ada Examiner framework to express R elements like (i > 5 ⇒ y , , j > 7 ⇒ v ). Also, we hope to investigate the relationship to the path conditions presented by Hammer et al. [20] .
In the near future, we plan to experiment with the prototype implementation which is currently being developed by our student Jonathan Hoag. In future work, we might try to integrate it with the Bogor tool [18] to generate and/or check standard assertions that will increase precision. To ease expressiveness, we would like to allow multiple scopes to be simultaneously open. To handle realistic applications, we must extend the framework to an interprocedural setting. 5 On the web at http://why.lri.fr/ An important long-term goal is to provide for automatic information flow analysis. This requires (i) implementing a tool to check the satisfiability of VCs; and (ii) developing techniques for the automatic computation of loop flow invariants, and even object flow invariants. We expect that (ii) will involve fixed point iteration, using (i) to check for convergence, and using a form of widening [15] to ensure termination. For (i), we would need a sound axiomatization of 2 , where a trivial rule is that {φ ⇒ x , φ ⇒ w } 2 (φ ⇒ (x + w ) ) holds for all φ,x ,w ; it remains to be seen whether one can hope for a tool which is not just sound but also complete. Relatedly, we would like to investigate whether our analysis is in some sense "optimal", with the preconditions being "weakest", assuming that the program is decorated with suitable assertion statements (without such assertions our analysis can be imprecise, cf. the example at the end of Sect. 1).
[VC ]{Θ} (R) ⇐= while B do S0 {Θ} iff 
